Not even half of the story
Napoleon's decision to invade and occupy Spain in 1808 was arguably his greatest strategic political and military blunder. The Russian campaign of 1812 may have cost Napoleon more in terms of men and resources, but the Emperor was perfectly cognizant of the tremendous risk involved in taking on Tsar Alexander and collected an invasion force of three-quarters of a million men for the task, a staggering number for the period. In contrast to Russia, Napoleon believed that he could easily take Spain in a few months with 12,000 men. A quick and easy victory in Spain and Portugal, it was thought, would shore-up the continental system of keeping British goods out of Europe while providing Paris with a major source of hard currency infusion from the New World gold and silver mines. Far from being the cake walk envisioned, however, the Peninsular War dragged on for six years, cost France 150,000 casualties, inspired resistance and revolt across the empire and failed to generate any meaningful revenues for France. Like the kidnapping and execution of Duc d'Enghien in 1804, the decision to overthrow Spanish King Charles IV in 1808 was "worse than a crime; it was a mistake."

For modern strategists, the French experience on the Iberian Peninsula from 1808 to 1814 is the most compelling and enduring case study from the Napoleonic Era. The classic victories of Rivoli, Austerlitz, and Wagram may be interesting reading and make for satisfying staff rides, but they have limited, if any, contemporary applicability. The story of the Spanish insurrection and the frustration of the Imperial French forces in combating it, however, are as relevant today as the case studies of the British in Malaysia or the French in Algeria, which have grown in popularity as the US struggles to impose order in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, this much heralded military history by Oxford professor David Gates suffers from a too narrow focus on conventional military operations. His narrative describes in some detail and largely exclusively the military engagements between Wellington and the French forces under Junot, Soult, Massena and other marshals unlucky enough to be sent to Spain by Napoleon. "The Spanish Ulcer" does not address the social, political or economic dimensions of the Spanish insurrection, and the final product suffers because of it. Imagine reading a history of the Vietnam War that only deals with the conventional engagements between the US Army and regular North Vietnamese forces and treats the Viet Cong and domestic pressures in America as outside the scope of the book. That is what this book is like, and it is incredibly disappointing.

Those gripes aside, Gates does highlight a few points that are worth emphasizing. First, the regular Spanish forces contributed much more to the overall success against the French than is often noted. Napoleon invaded many countries where the local army just folded after suffering initial defeat; the Spanish showed up, fought, and died for many years and after many defeats. Gates argues rather persuasively that it was the Spanish and Portuguese forces that enabled Wellington to achieve his victories, if for no other reason than they enabled his rather small force of some 40,000 men to remain focused on aggressive, offensive operations and not garrison duty or other necessary but essentially defensive tasks. Second, British sea power played a critical role in defeating the French in Spain. The peninsula was a logistical nightmare and the British navy was able to keep victuals flowing to English forces while landing amphibious strike forces anywhere along the coast line to harass the French. Third, the allies benefited from a unity of command under a competent leader, Wellington, while the French struggled to maintain command-and-control as each commander was supreme in his military district, while the power and influence of Napoleon's brother, King Joseph, in Madrid, was limited and ineffective. Finally, Gates stresses the intelligence advantage that Wellington and the allies possessed throughout the conflict, which is rather standard for local forces in insurgencies. One of Napoleon's greatest strengths in his campaigns with the Grand Army in Europe was his use of cavalry and the intelligence edge it gave him. His forces in Spain, on the other hand, where the population was hostile and the terrain could not support large cavalry forces, were effectively blind and could not communicate with forces only a day or two away.

In sum, if you are looking for a crisp and decently readable account of Wellington's conventional operations in the Peninsular War this book will do. If you are interested in historical case studies on counter insurgency campaigns that provide a broad and nuanced view of the conflict, such as Alistair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace," then "The Spanish Ulcer" is not to be recommended.

Could have been better
This is the first history of the Peninsular War that I've read, so on the one hand I can't compare it to other works on the subject as some other reviewers have done. On the other hand, I perhaps view the book differently since I am outside of that context.

I found the book to be a useful precis of the military campaigns. I was disappointed that more attention wasn't paid to political and economic forces and repercussions, or to the geurillas. I found the book to be useful for listing what happened, but very light on explaining why. I understand that is, perhaps, too much to ask for in 1 volume. I was also disappointed at what I found to be a dry presentation of the sequence of events.

I found the writing style to be easy to read once I got past some annoying eccentricities. Gates' use of semicolons; seemed odd, at least to an American reader. It seems that 'Army of XYZ' need not be put in single quotation marks (and why single?) every time it is mentioned (I know, picky-picky). In the early chapters, Gates' switches between references to individuals by their names (e.g., "Marshal Soult") and their Imperial titles (e.g., "Duke of Dalmatia"), which was at first confusing to someone who was not already familiar with the personages so referenced.

The number of maps and figures is grossly inflated and they do not support the text well, partly because of their poor quality. I noticed that the same map of Badajoz is reproduced at least 4 times. As another reviewer notes, the randomly rotating compass rose is annoying. A set of two maps which purports to show troop positions on the first day of a battle (in the first map) and on the second day (in the second map) are, in fact, identical except for a small typo. Elsewhere, one encounters a map of a battle that is mentioned in the text but not described. Campaign-level maps do not often show terrain features or road networks; battle-level maps never attempt to illustrate troop movements or stages of the fighting. Several of the figures are reproductions of paintings of events, and are of such poor quality as to be worthless (oddly, except for two paintings by Goya, no attribution to artists is made--perhaps Gates was the painter). The publisher mentions that more than 100 maps and figures occur in the volume--which means that the book could have been at least 75 pages shorter (or could have included 75 more pages of analysis and interpretation).

In summary, I found this an educational outline of the military campaigns of the Peninsular War. The work is damaged by very poor production values. I found it a useful read, but not a very entertaining one--and sometimes a frustrating one.

A one volume history of the Peninsular War
David Gates' "The Spanish Ulcer" provides one of the very few single volume histories of the Peninsular War that attempts to address the entire conflict and not focus on, for example, the exploits of the Anglo-Portuguese Army. Gates addresses the actions of the Imperial French, the struggles of the Spanish politicians, armies and guerillas, and the fiasco of Portugal prior to the British intervention. That Gates manages to do in one volume what Charles Oman required seven volumes to cover is, however, both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, students of the era now have a single reasonably comprehensive summary of the Peninsular War phase. On the other hand, of necessity, much of the detail of a very complex conflict is compressed, while the narrative tends to jump from place to place. Some advance knowledge of the conflict is almost required to make sense of the many moving parts. Unfortunately, the maps provided in the text are not well designed and more confusing than helpful. Readers are advised to track the action on their own large map of the Iberian Peninsula. This book is strongly recommended to those with an interest in the Peninsular War but not the time or energy to work through the longer studies.

Somewhat Revisionist Account
This is a well constructed book on the Peninsular War. Indeed, to find any single, readable volume on this subject that attempts to cover all its aspects is great. Many books tend to concentrate on just Wellington's campaigns and the activities of the Anglo-Portugease army. Mr. Gates has noted that tendency and has tried to correct it. In doing so however, he has taken a rather highly critical approach. Whereas many earlier books were lavish in their praise of Wellington, Gates goes the opposite way. While it is good to provide a fair perspective, and this subject has certainly required that in English, Gates leans too much toward the revisionist set with his heavy criticism of Wellington. At times it seems that he almost wants to go out of his way to find fault with the Iron Duke.

That aside, this is still a worthwhile work if the reader takes understands the bias here. Gates descriptions of what the Spanish armies were doing fills in a lot of gaps on the subject. While often seen as imcompetent in most earlier English sources, the Spanish none the less kept the French off balance. Time and again the French would defeat them, and time and again, the Spanish would return to the fight with new armies. This was a major factor in preventing the French from concentrating against Wellington.

The battles themselves are crisply done, but often a little too heavy on single vollies taking down hundreds if not thousands of men during some of the actions. I think Gates gets a little carried away with himself there at times. Single vollies rarely accomplished this, but a series of them could over time. There are workable maps provided for most of the actions and campaigns, and while some of these are wanting in professional look, they do at least allow one to follow the action somewhat.

The main stength of this work is its wider perspective. We get to see what the numerous Spainish arimes were doing, as well as get a better understanding of what the French were up against in Iberia. I agree with Gates when he states that under the harsh circumstances of the French losing roughly a 100 men a day during the occupation, it is remarkable that they lasted as long as they did. This the book helps us to understand.

Overall this is a workmanlike study, easy to read, and with nice details of aspects not often covered in the numerous works on this subject. If one allows for the often blatant anti-Wellington revisionist slant, then there is much good that can come out of reading this work and comparing it to Weller's and Glover's books.

Very Good
Text, narrative, facts and readability all rate very high, 5 star level actually, but, and I just refuse to understand how, after pouring himself into researching and writing an excellent piece on a topic that is not, lets say, especially overwhelmed with offerings, he can allow the third grade drawings he includes to be foisted off as maps.